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1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to analyze and make alternative proposals to the current 
system of general transfers to the municipalities in Spain, known as Municipal Revenue 
Sharing (Participación en los Ingresos del Estado –PIE-). These grants represent 
approximately two thirds of current municipal transfers which in turn represent one 
third of their revenues, with the rest of the current transfers coming from the 
Autonomous Communities (AC), although these are mainly conditional. 
 
The scant importance of the contribution of the ACs to the ordinary municipal funding 
makes it difficult to appreciate the considerable differences that exist between ACs in 
different regimes (common or charter). While in the first case the transfers from the 
ACs to the municipal Treasury has had an almost marginal importance, in the charter 
regions (Basque Country and Navarre), the regional level assumes the main proportion 
of the unconditional grants to the municipalities. In turn, municipalities in the Canary 
Islands also receive more resources from a regional fund financed mostly by income 
obtained in virtue of its special economic-financial regime. These peculiarities lead to 
some significant inequalities in the per capita funding received by local governments1.  
 
The current system of general transfers to the municipalities was established in the Law 
51/2002, although its enforcement came into effect in 2004. The system, in a clear 
parallelism with that of the ACs, was born with a permanent disposition eliminating the 
traditional five-yearly revision process. However, the regional government regime was 
modified in 2009, while the local system maintains the same regulation, in spite of the 
significant change of the economic cycle. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. First, we present the structural elements that should 
characterize an appropriate system of transfers according to the theoretical-normative 
principles. Subsequently, using a historical perspective, we describe the structure of the 
current model of general transfers to the Spanish municipalities and provide an 
evaluation of the system with particular emphasis in its main deficiencies. Finally, we 
                                                 
1 In this sense, if the average of per capita current transfers for all the municipalities was 100 in 2007, 
those belonging to the charter regime reached a value of 203, the canary ones 139 and the remaining 
municipalities in the general model only 93. 
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propose various alternatives for a possible reform and assess their potential effects using 
a simulation exercise. 
 
2. THE STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF A GENERAL TRANSFERS SYSTEM 
TO THE MUNICIPALITIES 
 
The economic literature justifies the existence of general transfers fundamentally, 
although not exclusively, for equity reasons. They are usually used to redress vertical 
and horizontal fiscal imbalances (equity among units in different levels of government 
and those in the same level such as the municipalities in our case) (Buchanan, 1950; 
Oates, 1972; Gramlich, 1977). According to these objectives, we can summarize the 
main structural elements of an appropriate system of unconditioned transfers in some 
lines that can serve us as a guide in the analysis and evaluation of the Spanish municipal 
transfers system (Boadway and Shah, 2007): 
 
a) Related to the objective of vertical balance is the determination of the amount of the 
transfer and its evolution and revision period with the aim of designing a stable and 
flexible system. 
 
The vertical imbalance arises from the existing differences between the spending needs 
derived from the responsibilities assumed by the sub-central governments and their own 
revenues, which are usually insufficient compared to the situation of the central 
government. The importance of this imbalance is a result of two opposing forces. On 
the one hand, the relative ease to decentralize services to the lower levels of 
government; on the other, the evident difficulty to decentralize revenues to small units 
of government fulfilling the demanding principles of tax assignment. This tension and 
consequent imbalance could become accentuated in the future due to the foreseeable 
loss of importance of the local resources motivated by recent economic changes2.  
 
From a theoretical viewpoint, the total amount of the general grants should guarantee 
similar coverage levels in the provision of services in every jurisdiction given a certain 
                                                 
2 Among those changes we can mention the increasing importance of intangible assets in the generation 
of output, the development of e-commerce or the increase of competition between jurisdictions 
(Tannenwald, 2002). 
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tax effort (Broadway, 2001). The difficulty of calculating this value appropriately 
makes it advisable for it to be the result of a political negotiation between those 
responsible of both levels of government. In the case that the option chosen to restore 
the vertical balance is a transfer, it should be unconditional so that the municipalities 
can freely spend it according to their needs (expenditure autonomy). 
 
Although the vertical balance between the central and municipal government can be 
reached thanks to the general transfer, it is highly probable that new imbalances may 
arise in the future. The reason for this may be the different expected evolution of the 
expenditure needs and the fiscal capacities in each of the levels of government. The 
lesser flexibility of the tax revenues of the sub-central governments and the greater 
elasticity of their expenditures with regards to the central government will end up 
breaking up the initial financial balance. Its maintenance thus requires the existence of 
certain commitments about the evolution of the main elements and review period. 
 
Regardless of the vertical imbalance, the neutralization using transfers must be flexible 
and stable according to the comparative experience. Once the amount has been 
determined, the first objective can be reached by associating the grant to a particular 
index of evolution representing (directly or indirectly) the resources of the central 
government, while the second one requires a review of the system every few years. In 
the case of opting for a direct participation in the resources, that it should entail a wide 
range of income would be the preferred option, not only because the evolution of the 
transfer would be less variable but also to avoid possible strategic behaviors by the 
central government.  
 
b) In terms of the horizontal balance, the desirable transparency requires the existence 
of a simple formula, whose design could have an equalization purpose or simply 
distributive depending on the objectives established by the government. 
 
Given that expenditure needs and fiscal capacities are not uniformly distributed among 
the municipalities, similar individuals can enjoy different public services (in terms of 
quantity or quality) depending on their place of residence (horizontal inequity). 
Consequently, disparities in expenditure needs and/or fiscal capacities among units 
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belonging to the same level of government (municipalities) are the cause or reason of 
horizontal imbalances. 
 
The transfers should be distributed among the municipalities following a simple 
formula, thus guaranteeing, not only the transparency of the system but rather ensuring 
that those revenues are stable, so that the municipalities can take them into account to 
calculate their budgeting correctly. The formula can have an equalization design in 
order to eliminate differences between the municipal fiscal capacities and allowing them 
to cover their expenditure needs in equivalent proportions, if they apply similar tax 
efforts. Another option is a distributive formula with multiple factors which only aims 
to improve the municipal sufficiency without a balancing objective. 
 
The design of the transfer depends on the sort of services provided. In this sense, 
equalization transfers seem to be more suitable for decentralized governments that 
assume responsibilities on the main social services of the Welfare State such as health 
or education, while its implementation for municipalities offering essentially a range of 
basic services is difficult to support. Therefore, we will focus on the analysis of 
distributive formulas that have also been the traditional option used in the Spanish 
municipal transfer system. 
 
These models, also known as variables-based or multiple factor formulas, only intend 
to improve the sufficiency through an accepted distribution of the general transfer 
among the various municipalities. The first stage consists in dividing the general 
transfer in parts and distributing them according to various indicators comprised 
between zero and one, so that their sum is equal to one. Subsequently, each of those 
parts is distributed based on a series of indicators representative of expenditure needs 
and fiscal capacities3. Logically, given that the formula is additive, the capacity 
indicator is included by its inverse, so the lower the relative fiscal capacity of the 
municipality, the higher the transfer assigned. 
 
The variables included and their weights are usually determined by political decisions 
whose suitability may depend on the degree of acceptance of the results by the parties 
                                                 
3 Other factors can also be included, such as the fiscal effort. 
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involved. Analytically, if we consider that Q is the amount of the unconditioned transfer 
and Si the corresponding grant assigned to the municipality i, the distributive formula of 
multiple factors would have the following expression:  
 
IICbINaQ +=    (1) 
∑= iSQ   a+b = 1 
QIICbINaS iii )( +=  
 
where IN and IIC are indexes which respectively reflect the expenditure needs and the 
fiscal capacity (inverse). 
 
c) Distribution criteria.  Regardless of the formula selected to distribute the resources 
among the municipalities, its success depends on the correct selection and quantification 
of the factors representing expenditure needs and fiscal capacities. 
 
The expenditure needs depend on the range of services provided, so they can vary 
across municipalities due to different provision costs or because the units of service 
required can also be different4. The simplest option would be considering the total 
population as an indicator of needs, although its demographic composition can also be 
used. The argument normally used to sustain this choice is that the younger population 
usually demands more educational services, while the demand of health and social 
services grows when the proportion of elder population is higher. However, in our case 
the utilization of the total population seems to be the most appropriate option given that 
municipalities do not provide those services. Furthermore, this value is easy to calculate 
and difficult to manipulate. 
 
Another relevant aspect with regards to the determination of the needs deals with the 
costs of provision, which can be much greater in some municipalities than in others due 
to differences in their geographic and climate conditions and even due to an unequal 
impact of certain factors such as poverty and unemployment (Boex and Martinez-
Vasquez, 2007). Actually, there are multiple blocks of municipalities demanding for 
increased grants to offset those differences (e.g. those located in rural areas with 
                                                 
4 See Ahmad (1997) for a review of the literature on this issue. 
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difficult access or the tourist ones). However, the possibility of further refining these 
elements of cost per unit of service or adjusting the criteria according to differentiated 
demands seems to be more appropriate in a regional context where the geographic 
characteristics are similar and therefore disparities among local governments´ provision 
costs are less significant. Indeed some of these indicators have been included in some of 
the regional transfer schemes designed by some CAs to provide their municipalities 
with additional resources with the aim of improving their levels of sufficiency. In any 
case, we should not neglect the efficiency problems that can arise when these factors of 
differentiated costs are used in a distributive formula (Broadway, 2004 and Borge, 
2011). 
 
The fiscal capacity represents the revenues that the municipalities can obtain from their 
tax bases. Its calculation is not simple, although this definition makes clear that 
revenues should not embody capacity. Rejecting the previous identification, the most 
common options are either the use of (indirect) macroeconomic indicators or more or 
less representative of the tax system at the local level (Shah, 2008). The first option 
entails difficulties both theoretical and in practice because these data are not often 
available at this level and its accuracy may be questionable. The other alternative seems 
more reasonable, since it measures the fiscal capacity by the revenue that could be 
raised if the local governments apply a standard (or average) rate to the fiscal bases of 
their taxes. In this case, the relative importance that each tax has in the total collection 
of the group of municipalities should be used as weights to obtain the indicator of 
capacity instead of using the weights of each particular municipality thus avoiding the 
indicator from being manipulated.  
 
d) Finally, as a general recommendation, the basic decisions regarding these structural 
elements should be excluded from the behavior of the units delivering and receiving the 
transfers. 
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3. THE SPANISH GENERAL TRANSFER SYSTEM FOR MUNICIPALITIES 
3.1. Background and current model 
 
The current PIE regulation, in effect since 2004, came into effect with the approval of 
Law Decree 51/2002 which significantly modified the previous system of general 
transfers to Local Authorities.   
 
The previous model (1999 – 2003) consisted in an unconditional transfer whose amount 
was revised every five years and which evolved during that period according to the 
nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with a minimum guarantee of growth 
equivalent to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Asides from some specific cases 
(Madrid, Barcelona and basically their respective Metropolitan Areas), the total transfer 
was distributed based on several factors. The main part is assigned to the weighted 
population with increasing coefficients according to municipal size (75%)5. Besides 
another factor of need (school units) whose weight in the distribution was reduced 
(2.5%), the rest of the transfer was distributed according to fiscal capacity (8.5%) and 
fiscal effort (14%), although both of them were incorrectly calculated. 
 
This model had some funding guarantees that, along with the attention to specific 
situations, limited the effectiveness of the distribution formula: a general guarantee so 
that no municipality could see their transfer reduced with the revision of the system 
(statu quo rule) and another specific one for municipalities with less than 5,000 
inhabitants, which were guaranteed a minimum transfer per capita. 
 
The current model of transfers establishes a “dual” system different based on (basically) 
municipal size. In the case of municipalities with a registered population equal to or 
greater than 75,000 inhabitants (and some with lower population but which are capitals 
of provinces or Autonomous Communities), the general transfer assigned to each of 
them in the base year (2004) splits into two components: a group of territorialized tax 
shares in different state taxes and the so-called Complementary Financing Fund (CFF) 
                                                 
5 The municipalities with a population greater tan 500,000 inhabitants were weighted with a coefficient of 
2.8, those with more tan 100,000 inhabitants with a 1.47, those with more than 50,000 with a 1.32, those 
with more than 20,000 with a 1.30, those with more than 10,000 with a 1.17, those with more than 5,000 
with a 1.15 and those with a lower population with a coefficient of 1. 
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(Cession Model). On the other hand, the distribution formula is maintained for the rest 
of the municipalities with some changes (Variables Model). 
 
The application of one or other system for each municipality is revised every four years 
taking into account its population. The first revision came into effect in 2008 which 
made six municipalities which belonged to the variables model to pass to the cession 
model. Tables 1 and 2 report the distribution per municipalities and population between 
both models for the base year (2004) and 2008. It is worth noting that the cession model 
affects only 1% of municipalities, although its impact in terms of population is more 
balanced reaching 43.4% in both years. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of municipalities between models (2004) 
Municipalities Nº % Population % 
Cession 84 1.0 18,750,367 43.4 
Variables 8,025 99.0 24,447,317 56.6 
TOTAL 8,109 100.0 43,197,684 100.0 
Source: Self-elaborated using data from the General Directorate of Financial 
Coordination with Local Governments – Dirección General de Coordinación Financiera 
con las Entidades Locales – (DGCFEL). 
 
Table 2. Distribution of municipalities between models (2008) 
Municipalities Nº % Population % 
Cession 90 1.1 19,985,683 43.4 
Variables 8,022 98.9 26,172,139 56.6 
TOTAL 8,112 100.0 46,157,822 100.0 
Source: Self-elaborated using data from DGCFEL 
 
Municipalities with the greatest size received, in the base year (2004), a transfer equal to 
the result of updating the amount received in the last year of the previous five-year 
period (2003), according to the evolution rate of the central state revenues (ITE for its 
Spanish initials; Índice de Ingresos Tributarios del Estado), excluding those assigned to 
the ACs such as Personal Income Tax (IRPF for its Spanish initials – Impuesto sobre la 
Renta de las Personas Físicas), VAT (IVA for its Spanish initials – Impuesto al Valor 
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Agregado) and excise taxes (Impuestos sobre Consumos Específicos). The calculation 
of this evolution rate (ITE), according to the dispositions established in the Law Decree 
21/2001, follows a cash-basis criterion, which regulates the AC’s funding system. This 
criterion implies that the revenues corresponding to the central government are 
calculated as the difference between the total amount of revenues collected in the 
country and the sum of deposits made in favor of the Autonomous Communities6 and 
the final settlements corresponding to the two previous years7. 
 
The transfer for the base year is divided into two parts, territorial tax shares and the 
Complementary Financing Fund (CFF). The first consists of fixed percentages in the 
unassigned yields to the ACs of several state taxes: Personal Income Tax (1.6875%), 
VAT (1.7897%) and excise taxes (2.0454%). In the Personal Income Tax, the 
assignment of the municipal collection is obtained directly from the taxes paid by the 
residents living in the municipality. However, in the case of indirect taxes (VAT and 
excise) the assignment follows a very indirect process; first, based on the importance of 
consumption of the autonomous community to which the municipality belongs to in the 
national consumption and, second, according to the registered population of the 
municipality in the region. The second element, the CFF, acts as an adjustment 
mechanism, since the amount for each municipality in the base year (2004) is calculated 
as a difference between the general grant for that year and the result obtained from the 
territorial tax shares. 
 
Table 3 shows the relative importance of the general transfer components in the cession 
model in 2004. It can be noted that the CFF accounts for almost 85% of the total 
resources (on average) while the remaining 15% accounts to the set of shared taxes 
among which we can highlight the Personal Income Tax with a little more than 7% of 
the total. Even more relevant still are the extreme cases, which these average results 
hide, due to its possible effects in dynamic terms. Hence, the CFF represent 95% of the 
total resources in some municipalities (e.g. Telde) where, due to the special regime of 
the Canary Islands, indirect taxes do not exist. In contrast, the shared taxes reach their 
                                                 
6 This amount is based on the budget revenue forecasts according to the evolution of the previous years.  
7 This two year delay corresponds to the time necessary to be able to determine the final settlement of 
various tax figures, specially the Personal Income Tax. 
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maximum in the third part of the transfer represented mainly by the Personal Income 
Tax (Alcobendas). 
 
Table 3. Relative weight of different components in the cession model (2004) 
 Mean Max Min 
Personal Income Tax (IRPF) 7.35% 20% 4% 
VAT 5.9% 16% 0% 
Excise taxes 2.1% 4,5% 0% 
Tax Shares 15.3% 33% 5% 
Complementary Financing Fund (CFF) 84.6% 95% 67% 
Total 100.0%   
Source: Self-elaborated using data from DGCFEL 
 
In dynamic terms, the CFF evolves according to ITE, while the territorial tax shares 
depend on the own collection of revenues in each municipality (Personal Income Tax) 
or the evolution of state revenues (VAT and excise taxes). Likewise, for the latter, the 
evolution may also depend on the greater dynamism of consumption of the Autonomous 
Community to which the municipality belongs with regards to the national average and 
the municipal population with regards to that of its Autonomous Community. 
 
For most municipalities, those with a population of less than 75,000 inhabitants (which 
are not capitals of province or AC), the distribution formula has been maintained, 
although some significant changes were introduced. The total amount of the transfer is 
increased according to the growth of ITE, the minimum funding is eliminated for 
municipalities with a population of less than 5,000 inhabitants, although the statu quo 
clause was kept, so the amount received by each municipality in the last year of the 
previous five-year period (2003) is guaranteed. 
 
The calculation of the transfer in the base year (2004) was different for municipalities 
belonging to different models. Those included in the cession model increased their 
specific transfer according to ITE2004/2003 (3.39%). In contrast, in the variables model the 
2003 overall transfer evolves in proportion to ITE to obtain the amount corresponding 
to 2004, which later is distributed among municipalities, taking into account the amount 
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guaranteed for each of them (the total amount obtained in 2003). In fact, this guarantee 
has had considerable impact in the results of the model as we will discuss later in the 
text. 
 
Once the overall transfer for each year is established, it is divided in blocks, which are 
distributed based on a series of variables, which try to gather the municipal differences, 
in terms of spending needs, fiscal capacity and tax effort. 
 
The population retains its weight in the general transfer (75%) and remains as the only 
variable representing spending needs. The weights assigned to population are adjusted 
according to what the regulation requires for additional services8. The so-called tax 
capacity increases its weight until it equals tax effort (with a 12.5%). Surprisingly, these 
variables were not defined in the original regulation (Law Decree 51/2002), although 
they did in various subsequent Budget Laws. The tax capacity is calculated using the tax 
base of the Property Tax (IBI for its Spanish Initials – Impuesto a los Bienes Inmuebles) 
as a reference, while the tax effort retains its definition as a ration between the real and 
potential revenue collection and refers only to the three existing compulsory taxes for 
local governments (Property, Economic Activity and Vehicles). 
 
Besides these two systems, there is also a mixed model for the so-called “Tourist 
Municipalities”, those with a population greater than 20,000 inhabitants and whose 
number of holiday homes exceeds the number of regular housing9. For these 
municipalities the total amount to be received is divided into two components: a tax 
share of 2.0454% from the revenues collected (and not assigned to ACs) from taxes on 
Hydrocarbons and Tobacco Labors, which is distributed according to the same criterion 
explained for indirect taxes in the cession model and a transfer, which is obtained 
subtracting the previous quantity to the amount they would be entitled to receive, 
according to the formula applicable to the municipalities of the variables model, for 
whose determination, the statu quo guarantee is also taken into account. 
 
                                                 
8 Municipalities with a population between 50,000 and 75,000 inhabitants are weighted with a coefficient 
of 1.4, those between 20,000 and 50,000 with a 1.3, those between 5,000 and 20,000 with a 1.17 and 
those with a lower population with a 1. 
9 This system was applied in 2009 to 21 municipalities, the only ones that fulfill both requirements. 
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Finally, as an addition to the local financing system, within the transfers we can find 
two different compensations granted to the local governments for the loss of revenue 
caused by the reform of the Economic Activity Tax. The first one, regulated in the tenth 
additional provision of Law Decree 51/2002, recognizes this loss since the first year of 
application (2004) and evolves according to ITE. The second one, established in the 
second additional provision of Law Decree 22/2005, was incorporated into the model in 
2006 and evolves in the same terms as the ITE between this fiscal year and the 
corresponding year. 
 
3.2 Assessment 
 
In the assessment of the new model, we base our arguments on two fundamental 
elements described in section 2: the existence of adequate connections between the 
transfer and factors representing expenditure needs and fiscal capacity and the updating 
of the transfers by means of an appropriate evolution index. 
 
The dual model described previously does not respond in the same way to these two 
basic elements. While the transfer of the cession model (CFF) evolves disconnected 
from the evolution of municipal need and relative capacity indicators, the one 
corresponding to the municipalities of the variables model does distribute the resources 
taking into account the relative evolution of those indicators, although with certain 
limitations. 
 
On the other hand, the ITE rate has experienced considerable changes since 2004, which 
notably affect the grants received by local governments, since this rate is used to 
determine the evolution of the overall transfer in the variables model and the CFF (the 
main part) of each municipality in the cession model. Until 2007, coinciding with the 
period of economic expansion, it increased significantly. Since then and until 2009, last 
year for which we have available data about settlements, it decreased according to the 
profound economic crisis in which we are still immersed. Furthermore, it should be 
stressed that the procedure used to calculate this rate has made the fall of resources from 
both systems even greater than what the real evolution of the revenues that make up its 
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original base reflect10. This fact, along with optimistic government forecasts in their 
deposits, has caused the well-known negative settlements from the municipalities for 
the last two fiscal years whose total accumulated debt in 2008 and 2009 amounts to 
3.730 millions11.  
 
Another element with a considerable impact in the results of both models is the 
existence of a funding guarantee in the variables model. In fact, this guarantee in the 
form of a minimum funding equal to the transfer received in 2003 exists in the case of 
the variables model, but it was not taken into consideration in the cession model 
because it was considered irrelevant. Those municipalities were very optimistic, since 
they assumed that the CFF would increase according to the positive evolution of ITE 
and that the territorial tax shares would exceed even the growth of that index such that 
the resources transferred to each municipality belonging to this system would exceed 
each year the revenues obtained in the initial year. Actually, this hypothesis was 
confirmed in the years of economic expansion (until 2007) but then the evolution turned 
out with the consequences that we will point out later. 
 
The following is a specific assessment of each one of these systems in light of the two 
elements indicated, using as a reference the data from the settlements of both systems 
during the period from 2004 – 2009. 
 
3.2.1 Cession model 
 
The analysis of this model can be approached both in static as well as in dynamic terms. 
From a static perspective, the main problem arises in the calculation of an adequate 
territorial tax share of indirect taxes (VAT and excise), because it is determined by a 
                                                 
10 This phenomena is a result of the incorrect forecasts made by the government for the determination of 
the advance payments on account for the Autonomous Communities and the inability to correct them 
through the settlement by means of the previously mentioned application of the cash-basis, since the 
payments made in 2009 do not refer to this fiscal year but rather to the two previous ones, when the 
effects of the crisis were not yet as obvious. The direct consequence is that the proportion of resources 
assigned to the Autonomous Communities suffered a considerable increase between 2008 and 2009, 
specially in the Personal Income Tax and the VAT, therefore the part not assigned decreased and ITE fell 
even more than central government revenues. In fact, it can be proved that the total tax revenue prior to 
the payment to the Autonomous Communities and Local Governments increased between 2004 and 2009, 
while the ITE rate fell almost 20% between these two years. 
11 These debit balances will be compensated with charges to the deposits from the next five fiscal years, 
according to the regulations in article 99 of Law Decree 39/2010. 
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combination of relative regional consumption and the relative weight of the municipal 
population with regards to the autonomous community. From our viewpoint, this 
indirect method does not provide a good proxy of the municipal consumption, thus tax 
shares in these taxes lose their main advantages as an indicator of commercial 
dynamism. On the other hand, these shares, even when they are correctly calculated as it 
happens with those derived from the Personal Income Tax, still have the same nature as 
the other component of the of the PIE (CFF), i.e., they are also transfers. 
 
The dynamic perspective has an added interest derived from the legislator’s intention of 
considering the new system as permanent, eliminating the traditional five-year revision, 
in a clear parallelism with the funding system of Autonomous Communities12. In light 
of the results of the model’s settlements, during the expansion stage the system 
consolidated the main defects of the previous model: the incorrect design of the 
distribution formula established until 2003 and the maintenance of a differentiated 
treatment in favor of certain municipalities. 
 
With regards to the distribution formula, the problems affect all of its components. The 
main drawback comes from the excessive high coefficient assigned to the municipalities 
located in the section of the most population (2.8) which practically doubles the weight 
assigned to the inhabitants of municipalities in the next section (1.47). The justification 
for of these differences in the coefficients derive from political reasons, since the 
pressure that the large municipalities exerted in the negotiating process exceed 
economic reasons based on economies of scale. Actually, this criterion cannot be found 
in other municipal transfer systems around the world and it would not even endure an 
internal comparison with the regional transfer model (Pedraja, 2011). On one hand, 
there is no legal obligation to provide more services once the 50,000 inhabitants have 
been exceeded and, on the other hand, previous empirical studies applied to Spanish 
data detected diseconomies of scale for population levels much more reduced (Solé and 
Bosch, 2005). From an international comparative perspective, the greater weight of an 
inhabitant for populations greater than 500,000 inhabitants with regards to those of the 
immediately previous sector rarely exceeds 10% (e.g. Germany), when in the Spanish 
case it reaches 90%. Even in the regional context in our country the differences in 
                                                 
12 However, this model was revised in 2009, while the local financing system is still in force. 
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adjusted population between the extreme values of Autonomous Communities do not 
reach 12% in the last funding model approved in July 2009, in spite of considering 
typical services of the Welfare State (health, educational or social services) different 
from those traditionally provided by municipalities.  
 
Another defect in the distribution formula was the use of a capacity factor which 
incorrectly identified this indicator with tax revenues, which among other reasons, has 
caused a distribution of the transfers contrary to the prescriptions of theory13. Finally, 
the calculation of the tax effort also presents significant shortcomings that lead us to 
propose its exclusion from the distributive formula as we will explain in detail later in 
the text. 
 
Several municipalities (Madrid, Barcelona, Cadiz and Santa Coloma de Gramanet) 
benefited from the application of a differentiated treatment in the former distribution 
formula14, guaranteeing them a share per capita much greater to the average15. Given 
that the additional funds intended for these municipalities are subtracted from the 
general funding, they represent a clear source of inequity, since other particular needs of 
multiple municipalities are not recognized in the same manner. 
 
The disconnection between the evolution of the transfers (CFF) and the indicators 
representing municipal expenditure needs and fiscal capacity also affects those 
inequalities and may cause the appearance of new ones. Actually, even accepting that 
there were no inequalities in the starting situation, the maintenance of horizontal equity 
over time would require that the expenditure needs as well as the tax capacities of all 
municipalities in the system must evolve at the same rate, which at the same time 
should coincide with the ITE rate. This hypothesis is difficult to sustain as much for the 
expansion stage (until 2007) as for the recession stage (until 2009). This lack of equity, 
                                                 
13 In the base year, 2004, the transfer had  a low correlation (0.022) with an opposite sign to that expected 
(positive instead of negative) with regards to an authentic capacity variable represented by the tax base of 
the Property Tax. 
14 The first two maintain the privileges of financing outside the system in the previous financing model, 
while the second ones, despite having a population of less than 500,000 inhabitants, have a coefficient of 
2.8 assigned to their population in the formula to compensate them for the poor growth capacity as a 
result of their especial orography.  
15 In 2007 the average PIE per capita of the group of municipalities included in the cession model was 
228 Euros, whereas Cadiz and Santa Coloma de Gramanet received almost 400 Euros, Madrid 435 and 
Barcelona 580. 
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in a dynamic sense creates increasing concern in a model which eliminated the 
traditional five-year revision when the legislator considered the new system as 
permanent. 
 
The data shown in Table 4 provides evidence to support that the evolution experienced 
in both periods by expenditure needs – represented by the population – and fiscal 
capacities – represented by territorial tax shares or the Personal Income Tax as a more 
refined measure16 – reflects important differences with regards to ITE. The latter 
increased in 36.5% during the first stage and decreased in 41.4% from 2007 to 2009. 
Obviously, if we focus on specific cases these differences can be even more significant 
as a result of the different rates of evolution experienced by multiple transfer 
components in each municipality and their different relative weights. 
 
Table 4. Evolution of population and resources in the cession model during two 
different periods (2004-2007 and 2007-2009) 
2004-2007 Mean Max Min 
Population 3.55% 24.46% -3.52% 
Personal Income Tax 39.26% 72.03% 24.95% 
Shared Taxes 26.51% 42.0% 15.7% 
CFF (ITE) 36.49% - - 
Total resources 34.61% 37.46% 30.46% 
2007-2009 Mean Max Min 
Population 2.73% 17.22% -1.39% 
Personal Income Tax 5.22% 18.51% 13.4% 
Shared Taxes -19.67% 7.31% -34.47% 
CFF (ITE) -41.37% - - 
Total resources -37.56% -32.19% -40.28% 
Source: Self-elaborated using data from DGCFEL. 
 
                                                 
16 Being the most important component of the tax basket and having a proper territorialization criterion. 
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Besides the problems mentioned above about the calculation of the ITE, it is worth 
mentioning those caused by the application of the new cession percentages to the 
Autonomous Communities (50% of the Personal Income Tax, 50% of VAT and 58% of 
Excise Taxes) derived from the new regional funding model applied since 2009. These 
changes entail the reduction in the resources received by municipalities due to the 
evolution of ITE and minor tax shares. In this new scenario, the modification of the tax 
share percentages and the method used to calculate ITE are obligatory in order to avoid 
potential reduction of resources derived from discretionary decisions taken by the 
central government. In our opinion, this situation is a consequence of an underlying 
problem, the predominance of the regional over the municipal level, which causes the 
reforms introduced in the regional funding system to be approved without considering 
their effects on the municipal funding. 
 
3.2.2 Variables model 
 
This model has experienced some noteworthy advances with regards to the situation 
prior to the last reform. The main one was the introduction of an authentic indicator of 
tax capacity, although its determination is limited to the Property Tax. Another positive 
point is the adjustment made on the weightings of the population in order to adapt them 
to the legal framework regarding services provided and population size. 
 
The main defect remains the use of the indicator of tax effort in the distribution formula. 
Despite having limited its determination to the mandatory taxes, it continues to have 
strange values which are a result of the incorrect expression it uses in the case of the 
Economic Activities Tax, the absence of data about the Vehicles Tax and the use of 
internal weightings for the final calculation of the index, which makes it manipulable. 
Given the strange results produced by this indicator, the regulation establishes some 
specific limits regarding its amount in order to reduce the potential distortions that it can 
cause in the distribution of resources. Taking into account all these reasons and the 
discrimination that entails the application of this flawed indicator only upon the 
municipalities of the variables system, we consider that the best option would be to 
eliminate it from the distribution formula. 
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The shortcomings described above may be relegated to second place when we analyze 
the results from the last available settlement of the system for 2009, a year in which the 
unfavorable evolution of the ITE should have considerably reduced the transfers 
received by the municipalities. Nevertheless, the existence of the financial guarantee 
and its generalized application to all the municipalities allowed them to avoid a huge 
decrease of their resources. The negative differences between the amount that each 
municipality should receive according to the criteria of the formula and the guarantee 
were compensated with the positive differences registered by some municipalities (a 
minority) and an additional contribution from the central government close to 500 
million Euros17. Indeed, the amount of the transfer received by all the municipalities 
included in this system in 2009 equals the amount obtained in the last year of the 
previous five-year period (2003). 
 
The application of the financial guarantee is, as anticipated, an advantage with regards 
to the municipalities included in the cession model. In fact, among the municipalities 
that went from one model to the other in 2008, after the first revision of the scope of 
application (El Ejido, Gandia, Orihuela, Pozuelo de Alarcon, Las Rozas de Madrid y 
Torrent), four of them would have obtained more resources if they had continued in the 
variables model18. 
 
In this sense, it is interesting to compare the percentage distribution of the transfer and 
its value in per capita terms among the municipalities in different models in both the 
base year (2004) and the final year (2009)  (Table 5). These data allow us to verify that 
the percentage gain of the municipalities of the variables model is three points19 and the 
difference in PIE per capita between the cession and variables models was reduced in 70 
euros going from more than 100 euros in 2004 to less than 40 euros in 2009. 
 
                                                 
17 This additional injection of resources by the State remains unnoticed because all the municipalities 
included in this system of variables registered a negative settlement in the 2009 fiscal year as a 
consequence of the previously mentioned optimistic government forecasts in the determination of the 
deposits. 
18 The losses to these four municipalities reached a combined amount of 3.2 million Euros, while the two 
municipalities that obtained a greater financing with the assignment model (El Ejido y Orihuela) only 
increased their overall financing in 225 thousand Euros. 
19 The increase would be of 4% if the six municipalities that changed system in 2008 had remained in the 
variables model. 
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We should also bear in mind that since 2007 approximately 40% of the municipalities 
included in the variables model receive additional resources (outside of the model), 
from a special financing Fund in favor of municipalities with populations no greater 
than 20,000 inhabitants. This fund is financed by the Ministry of Public Administration 
with the purpose of bringing closer the per capita funding of the municipalities with 
fewer resources to the average of the rest20. Obviously, the arguments that supported the 
creation of this Fund, whose allocation has been declining in recent years21, are difficult 
to maintain in light of the previously mentioned results. 
 
Table 5. Distribution of total resources across models (2004 y 2009)  
2004 2009 
Municipalities 
Resources % PIE pc Resources % PIE pc 
Cession 4,309 € 58.7 229.80 3,642 € 55.9 180.49 
Variables 3,030 € 41.3 123.96 2,870 € 44.1 143.01 
TOTAL 7,339 € 100.0  6,512 € 100.0  
*Values represent million of euros. 
Source: Self-elaborated using data from DGCFEL 
 
Finally, the specific treatment given to tourist municipalities, justified again more due to 
political than economic reasons, unnecessarily complicates a system of general transfers 
that should not be used to address specific situations. The current regulation makes 
these municipalities be favored with regards to the group to which they belong to 
(variables model) if the evolution rate of their territorialized tax shares (taxes on 
Hydrocarbons and Tobacco) is higher than the ITE rate. The amount of the gain or loss 
in funding thus depends on the importance of the tax shares in the initial transfer of the 
base year (which did not reach the 5% average) and the differences in the 
aforementioned rates of evolution. The data reported in Table 1 of the Annex shows that 
these municipalities benefited in 2009, although the gains were very small (on average 
they did not reach 1% of the general transfer and represent only 1.12 Euros per capita). 
If we consider both the problems that the practical defining of this type of municipality 
                                                 
20 To be able to receive this additional allocation, it is a requirement that the coefficient of the average tax 
effort per capita to be greater than 1. 
21 The Fund dropped its allocation from 60 million Euros in 2009 to 45 millions in 2011.  
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and the problems that the calculation of the municipal tax shares entail, the maintenance 
of this specific system in the current conditions could be reconsidered. 
 
4. ALTERNATIVES AND PROPOSAL TO REFORM THE MODEL 
 
Reforming the local funding model at this time amid a profound economic crisis and 
given the peculiarities of the Spanish local structure, would require a broad political 
consensus, if we pretend for the reform to be a lasting one. The main points that should 
be discussed are: 1) the relative importance of the two main funding instruments (the 
own fiscal space and the transfers); 2) the existence or not of differentiated models 
(unitary, for all municipalities, or dual, distinguishing between large and small 
municipalities); and 3) how the financing local system fits with the existing regional 
model. 
 
Concerning the first of these matters, conflicting principles and incentives need to be 
combined adequately, such as the development of autonomy by means of establishing 
their own fiscal spaces on the basis of a few easy to manage local taxes with relevant 
tax collection capacity and respect towards the equity that must be obtained through the 
application of the transfers. 
 
With regard to the second one, given the structure of the Spanish local governments, 
characterized by a large number of small municipalities (85% of the total has less than 
5,000 inhabitants and the median do not reach 600 inhabitants), a dual model that 
divides municipalities according to their population size seems convenient. Actually, 
some of the main drawbacks of the reforms applied to local government have been 
originated due to their inability to adapt the changes to a heterogeneous reality which 
combines large with other very small municipalities. In this sense, it seems appropriate 
to propose a differentiated system of transfers between small and large municipalities22. 
 
The third basis for consensus requires increasing the importance of the role played by 
the Autonomous Communities in organizing both the local map, providing additional 
funding and creating incentives for the development of municipal shares on regional 
                                                 
22 We base our proposal in the ideas developed by Suárez et al (2008) and Pedraja and Suárez (2008), 
although we include some innovations. 
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revenues (the so-called PICAs for its Spanish initials – Participación en los Ingresos de 
las Comunidades Autónomas)23. This instrument should be more respectful of the local 
autonomy than the conditioned subsidy programs that proliferate nowadays. 
 
Below is the synopsis of a proposed differentiated or dual funding system for small 
municipalities, whose limit could be fixed for those with less than 20,000 inhabitants, 
and subsequently for municipalities of greater size. 
 
In the case of small municipalities the responsibilities assumed would be restricted to 
the basic services and their funding would be carried out by means of a very simple tax 
system consisting of the current mandatory taxes and fees, as well as by a system of 
unconditioned transfers of fixed amounts per capita. In the absence of cost accounting, 
the determination of this transfer per capita could be obtained from several relevant 
indicators (e.g. current expenditures, tax revenues or savings) of a certain type of 
municipality, once the extreme values for this group of municipalities have been 
eliminated. Those transfers could be complemented with others such as explicit 
incentive mechanisms for cooperation in the provision of the services. 
 
For the rest of the municipalities, the main idea that must prevail in the design of the 
reform is that the type of services provided determines the funding, i.e., the type of tax 
revenues, the scope of the transfers and even the relative importance of those 
components. This statement not only has a theoretical basis but can also be contrasted 
with comparative experiences24. Hence, the larger municipalities would also provide 
services related to personal affairs and even of a social nature, in addition to the basic 
ones, and all these services would be funded with the current taxes (conveniently 
reformed) and a system of tax shares on broad-based tax figures with the possibility of 
territorialization. This possibility of territorialization requires establishing another 
relevant critical size on which to establish the necessary fiscal connection points. In the 
case of the Personal Income Tax, the connection point seems relatively easy to 
determine using the fiscal address of the taxpayer and the local governments could even 
be granted a certain degree of regulating capacity which improves their levels of 
autonomy, e.g., granting them the possibility to establish a variable and limited 
                                                 
23 See Pedraja y Cordero (2011). 
24 See Mcmillan (2008).   
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surcharge. In the case of indirect taxes, the tax share should be established only if an 
authentic territorialization is possible, which is not the case at present. In our opinion, 
the number of purely local tax figures does not need to be increased, since we still have 
enough bases which could generate considerable revenues with low management costs.  
 
Finally, the transfer system should be based on a distribution formula which could 
eventually become an equalization formula in the case that municipalities assume new 
responsibilities. The population would be the main indicator of spending needs, 
although the weighting coefficients should be modified so that the existing differences 
between greater and smaller municipalities could be reduced in the future. On the other 
hand, an adequate indicator of fiscal capacity should be designed which incorporates, 
besides the bases of the local taxes, those corresponding to the new territorialized tax 
shares (specially, Personal Income Tax), and should grant greater resources to those 
with less capacity. 
 
The reform of the general transfers system should be implemented in a manner and 
within a reasonable period so that its objectives can be achieved without guarantees 
during this transition, other than the statu quo rule. 
 
With these guidelines, in the following lines we present a simulation exercise which 
assesses different reform alternatives from the model applicable to the municipalities 
with a population greater than 20,000 inhabitants25, which considers different scenarios 
and determines the cost of the statu quo in each of them. However, it must be noted that 
this rule has not always been incorporated into the system, as we described for the 
cession model. 
 
The reference in the comparison of the various alternatives is the current situation (A),  
which represents the amount obtained by the municipalities included within this group 
in the last fiscal year closed (2009), and which in total amounts to 3,503,106,399 Euros. 
We have excluded Madrid and Barcelona since they deserve a special attention in the 
model.  Likewise, in order to use as a reference the real figures of the transfers, we have 
                                                 
25 As a reference we have used the population available in January 2009 (National Statistics Institute).  
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included the funding guarantees from the variables model26. Finally, we have 
maintained the overall transfer for the municipalities with the purpose of evaluating the 
redistributive impact of the different alternatives proposed. 
 
The options considered are three distribution formulas with two indicators representing 
spending needs and fiscal capacity, respectively. The former is the population of each 
municipality, to which we assigned different weightings depending on how radical is 
the option designed. The latter is a capacity index based on the Real Property Tax, 
although more refined than the one currently in force in the formula of the variables 
model. Specifically, we estimate the tax revenues per capita based on the taxable 
income per capita of the Real Property Tax by means of a regression analysis27. Finally, 
taking into account the shortcomings of the fiscal effort, we have eliminated this 
indicator in the proposed options. 
 
• Proposal B: Population is used as a variable of need maintaining the coefficients in 
force during the previous period (1999-2003). The weights assigned to the 
indicators of need and capacity are the same, once we eliminated the effort in order 
to avoid potential distortions (the population is assigned a 90% and capacity a 
10%28). 
 
• Proposal C: It is different from the previous one in assigning some new weighting 
coefficients to the population with the aim of shortening the differences between the 
municipalities of greater size and the rest (1.5 for municipalities with a population 
greater than 100,000 inhabitants and 1 for the rest29). 
 
                                                 
26 The amounts corresponding to the municipalities of Almuñecar and Tacoronte have also been excluded 
since there was not available information for the calculation of the capacity indexes in 2009. 
27 The results of the regression are the following: 
ITpc = 258,86 + 9,60*BLiqIBIpc 
   (20,2) (0,56)      R2 = 0,43 
28 If we eliminate the school units (2.5%) and the tax effort (14%) from the formula in force until 2003 we 
have an 83.5% remaining. Since the population had a weight of 75% and capacity a weight of 8.5%, the 
new weightings for these variables would be 89.82% (75/83.5) and 10.18% (8.5/83.5), respectively, or, by 
simplifying, 90% for the population and 10% for capacity. 
29 The value of 1.5 was determined as a solution of commitment or mean between the extreme values of 
the weightings from the previous system for a population size legally considered as a large city.  
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• Proposal D: This option maintains the new weighting coefficients for population 
(1.5 and 1) and assumes a more balanced distribution of the transfer among the 
indexes of need and capacity assigning a 75% to the first and a 25% to the second. 
 
Obviously, the choice between these proposals would be determined by a political 
decision, although the technical issues are also relevant. On the one hand, some 
restrictions are obvious, such as the status quo rule (no one loses due to the change 
introduced in the system), as well as maintaining the cost of the new system within 
certain limits. Next we gather the cost of each proposal with regards to the initial 
situation, maintaining the status quo, as a percentage of the overall transfer received by 
this group of municipalities in the 2009 fiscal year (Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Status quo cost for each alternative 
B C D 
4.7% 9.4% 10.6% 
 
In view of the results, it is obvious that the alternatives that propose a more radical 
change in the weightings of the population are those which would entail greater 
differences in the distribution formula and, therefore, a greater cost for the government 
in the case of maintaining the status quo of the municipalities that would lose funding. 
 
In addition of the cost, another important issue is the identification of municipalities 
mainly affected by the changes introduced in the distributive formula. For that purpose, 
the information shown in Table 2 of the Appendix is considerably useful (it shows the 
results of the simulations for each of the municipalities ordered according to their 
population size) and even more the content of Table 7, in which we can distinguish the 
municipalities that obtained gains or loses in resources as well as the cost of the status 
quo in terms of money, distinguishing four sections of population. 
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Table 7. Winners, losers and costs for different municipal sizes 
 B C D 
Munic. 20.000- 50.000 inhab. 
Cost 
Max gain (%) 
Max loss (%) 
Benefited (%) 
Affected (%) 
 
21,628,417 
139.8 
-20.9 
84.3 
15.7 
 
19,843,187 
171.4 
-20.3 
79.6 
20.4 
 
7,260,291 
249.2 
-13.9 
91.9 
8.1 
Munic. 50.000-100.000 inhab. 
Cost 
Max gain (%) 
Max loss (%) 
Benefited (%) 
Affected (%) 
 
54,604,223 
39.3 
-50.3 
36.3 
63.7 
 
80,312,868 
34.7 
-52.8 
21.3 
78.7 
 
77,007,850 
41.1 
-52.1 
28.8 
71.2 
Munic. 100.000-500.000 inhab. 
Cost 
Max gain (%) 
Max loss (%) 
Benefited (%) 
Affected (%) 
 
85,616,818 
34.6 
-16.4 
13.5 
86.5 
 
19,943,161 
64.0 
-37.8 
96.2 
3.8 
 
36,220,222 
59.0 
-42.2 
65.4 
34.6 
Munic. >500.000 inhab. 
Cost 
Max gain (%) 
Max loss (%) 
Benefited (%) 
Affected (%) 
 
3,786.165 
8.9 
-2.3 
75 
25 
 
209,685,970 
-31.4 
-38.5 
0 
100 
 
252,134,066 
-38.8 
-45.2 
0 
100 
TOTALS 
Cost  
Benefited (%) 
Affected (%) 
 
165,635,623 
63.6 
36.4 
 
329,785,186 
68.5 
31.5 
 
372,622,429 
73.6 
26.4 
 
These results show that all the proposed formulas are beneficial for the vast majority of 
smaller municipalities (between 20,000 and 50,000 inhabitants), specially with the 
formula that grants lower weight to the need (D). In contrast, most municipalities 
located in the section between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants would lose resources 
with any distribution formula, although the most significant losses would arise when the 
weights assigned to the population are 1 and 1.5 (models C and D). 
 
The municipalities located in the following section (100,000 – 500,000 inhabitants) are 
clearly benefitted from the implementation of the two most radical alternatives 
(Proposals C and D), in which their population receive a coefficient of 1.5. Finally, also 
as expected, the municipalities with greater size experience considerable losses when 
using the simple weighting coefficients (1 and 1.5), i.e., with options C and D. 
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Another relevant aspect that should be highlighted is that all the alternatives considered 
lead to establish a correct link between resources and variables representing capacity. 
This connection can be measured through the Spearman correlation coefficients 
between the transfer corresponding to each of the alternatives and the estimated capacity 
index (Table 8). According to the values reported in this table, the current transfer 
(Option A) has a low correlation and with an opposite sign than expected with regards 
to the tax capacity variable (IF): +0.065. Nevertheless, all the proposals present a 
correlation with the capacity with the appropriate sign (negative), which becomes 
greater as the weight of this factor is increased in the distribution formula, being even 
statistically significant in option D (-0.192). 
 
Table 8. Correlation coefficients between different alternatives and the capacity index 
 Option A Option B Option C Option D Capacity Index 
Option A 1.000  
Option B 0.975** 1.000  
Option C 0.973** 0.996** 1.000  
Option D 0.929** 0.975** 0.990** 1.000 
Capacity 
Index 0.065 -0.029 -0.089 0.192** 1.000
** The correlation is significant at 1 per cent level. 
 
In our opinion, the adjustment of the general transfer according to the various 
alternatives proposed would lead to an improvement in terms of equity for the allocation 
of resources. Moreover, they would also allow connecting the transfer assigned to the 
municipalities with the evolution of their corresponding relative spending needs and 
fiscal capacity, although they would imply a disconnection with the revenues collected 
in the municipality. However, this could be achieved by implementing tax shares on 
some specific taxes, which would entail a slight correction in the definition of those 
alternatives. This modification would be the division of the general transfer into two 
different components (in a similar manner to the current cession system): 
 
27
 
 
• A group of territorialized tax shares on the Personal Income Tax and indirect taxes 
that should not exceed a specific percentage of the total transfer in order to avoid the 
existence of great divergences over time. 
 
• A general fund resulting from subtracting the previous tax shares from the total 
transfer calculated for the base year. 
 
The evolution of each of these components would be different. The territorialized tax 
shares would evolve according to the corresponding revenues collected in each 
municipality which will be different from each other, while the general fund should be 
associated to a general macroeconomic indicator (e.g., GDP) or to the revenues 
collected by the central government (ITE). In the case of opting for ITE, this index 
should be designed on a manner so that it could not be affected by potential changes 
that could be introduced in the regional funding system. 
 
This approach has the advantage of connecting part of the transfer with the economic 
evolution of the municipality (via territorialized tax shares), but it would maintain the 
inconvenient that the evolution of the transfer calculated in the base year would be 
disconnected from the evolution of needs and relative capacities of the municipalities. 
To avoid this problem, the formula could be used for the overall calculation of the 
transfers in the base year and this total amount would evolve annually according to the 
ITE. Subsequently, the overall amount calculated for every year would be distributed 
according to indicators of needs and capacity using the option selected among the 
alternatives, which would also include among the factors of capacity the new 
territorialized tax shares. Furthermore, as a stabilizing element for the transfer systems, 
it should be reviewed after a short period. 
 
Finally, if the municipalities assume new responsibilities due to changes in the 
allocation of competences across different levels of the government, the local funding 
system should be adjusted in order to strengthen the importance of the own revenues. 
This aims could be achieved allowing, e.g., the possibility to establish a variable and 
limited surcharge over the Personal Income Tax or designing a new equalization 
transfer scheme.  
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Table 1. Resources of the touristic municipalities in 2009 settlements 
 
 
Population 
2009 
Total 
Guaranteed
Resources 
2009 
PIE pc 
2009 
Hydrocarbons 
2009 
(1) 
Tobacco 
2009 
(2) 
Total  
2009 
(3)=(1)+(2) 
% 
Cession 
Cession 
2004 
Cession  
2004 x  
ITE(0.8003)
(4) 
Difference 
cession  
2009-2004 
(5)=(3)-(4) 
Extra 
funding % 
Extra 
funding pc 
Calpe/Calp 29,666 3,385,980.38 114.14 74,105.05 88,573.50 162,678.55 4.80% 166,812.24 133,499.84 29,178,71 0.86% 0.98 
Campello (El) 26,511 3,319,930.11 125.23 66,223.92 54,388.57 120,612.49 3.63% 127,053.78 101,681.14 18,931,35 0.57% 0.71 
Denia 44,464 5,758,538.16 129.51 111,070.14 119,777.91 230,848.05 4.01% 237,271.02 189,888.00 40,960,05 0.71% 0.92 
Javea/Xabia 31,593 4,683,580.44 148.25 78,918.65 88,741.31 167,659.96 3.58% 177,069.20 141,708.48 25,951,48 0.55% 0.82 
Santa Pola 31,760 3,977,809.09 125.25 79,335.81 89,839.23 169,175.04 4.25% 154,241.81 123,439.72 45,735,32 1.15% 1.44 
Pilar de la Horadada 22,050 2,057,291.86 93.30 55,080.44 62,556.65 117,637.09 5.72% 120,067.70 96,090.18 21,546,91 1.05% 0.98 
Calvia 51,774 8,061,449.82 155.70 157,946.87 472,874.93 630,821.80 7.83% 769,650.99 615,951.69 14,870,11 0.18% 0.29 
Palafrugell 22,365 3,055,594.32 136.62 60,283.65 53,686.99 113,970.64 3.73% 108,633.36 86,939.28 27,031,36 0.88% 1.21 
Almuñecar 27,696 3,928,264.93 141.84 67,547.40 71,420.71 138,968.11 3.54% 127,919.22 102,373.75 36,594,36 0.93% 1.32 
Isla Cristina 21,324 2,690,199.71 126.16 52,006.82 46,047.90 98,054.72 3.64% 97,820.72 78,285.92 19,768,80 0.73% 0.93 
Lepe 25,886 3,173,647.72 122.60 63,133.02 87,061.67 150,194.69 4.73% 127,278.43 101,860.93 48,333,76 1.52% 1.87 
Nerja 21,811 2,451,743.26 112.41 53,194.56 83,445.88 136,640.44 5.57% 144,204.78 115,407.09 21,233,35 0.87% 0.97 
Mazarron 35,221 3,537,799.59 100.45 112,785.44 83,798.27 196,583.71 5.56% 175,291.89 140,286.10 56,297,61 1.59% 1.60 
San Javier 31,432 3,753,558.17 119.42 100,652.22 61,513.86 162,166.08 4.32% 146,687.53 117,394.03 44,772,05 1.19% 1.42 
Castro-Urdiales 31,670 3,594,385.33 113.49 97,928.90 60,612.51 158,541.41 4.41% 142,866.34 114,335.93 44,205,48 1.23% 1.40 
Calafell 24,265 2,880,238.51 118.70 65,405.00 65,618.67 131,023.67 4.55% 122,651.63 98,158.10 32,865,57 1.14% 1.35 
Cambrils 31,720 3,640,946.88 114.78 85,499.55 93,578.87 179,078.42 4.92% 157,256.48 125,852.36 53,226,06 1.46% 1.68 
Vendrell (El) 35,821 4,399,719.27 122.83 96,553.58 78,350.23 174,903.81 3.98% 159,141.16 127,360.67 47,543,14 1.08% 1.33 
Salou 26,649 3,282,158.54 123.16 71,830.95 222,690.70 294,521.65 8.97% 347,461.58 278,073.50 16,448,15 0.50% 0.62 
Cullera 24,121 3,600,574.91 149.27 60,253.75 56,959.97 117,213.72 3.26% 119,717.28 95,809.74 21,403,98 0.59% 0.89 
Sueca 28,908 3,995,015.10 138.20 72,211.58 67,544.43 139,756.01 3.50% 144,160.43 115,371.59 24,384,42 0.61% 0.84 
TOTAL and AVERAGE 626,707 79,228,426 125.30 1,681,967.30 2,109,082.76 3,791,050.06 4.69% 3,873,258 3,099,768.03 691,282,03 0.92% 1.12 
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Table 2. Simulation results 
Municipalities Population 2009 A B C D 
Valencia 814,208 178,649,752 184,535,422 116,029,097 103,290,611 
Sevilla 703,206 163,247,277 159,461,111 100,336,157 89,417,961 
Zaragoza 674,317 140,503,068 153,023,516 96,384,204 86,027,908 
Málaga 568,305 121,706,138 129,259,118 81,670,806 73,235,689 
Murcia 436,870 53,894,005 52,649,261 62,960,377 56,594,779 
Palma 401,270 48,068,526 48,207,987 57,603,388 51,605,563 
Palmas de Gran Canaria 381,847 51,058,240 46,744,658 56,120,348 51,282,964 
Alicante 334,757 41,995,831 40,618,533 48,657,248 44,054,921 
Córdoba 328,428 43,250,064 39,574,405 47,323,047 42,531,549 
Valladolid 317,864 43,623,940 38,802,410 46,552,278 42,415,828 
Vigo 297,332 39,768,591 36,103,637 43,256,721 39,195,077 
Gijón 277,554 36,529,975 33,938,751 40,734,357 37,179,551 
Hospitalet de Llobregat (L') 257,038 37,242,458 31,440,365 37,738,794 34,457,019 
Coruña (A) 246,056 33,918,754 30,125,322 36,168,776 33,055,468 
Granada 234,325 32,180,564 28,506,254 34,170,175 31,022,489 
Elche/Elx 230,112 27,280,485 28,230,358 33,910,759 31,056,292 
Oviedo 224,005 28,803,844 27,462,323 32,982,559 30,185,026 
Santa Cruz de Tenerife 222,417 29,965,597 27,349,934 32,872,184 30,176,778 
Badalona 219,547 32,194,525 26,911,036 32,319,036 29,572,427 
Cartagena 211,996 26,438,759 25,702,077 30,782,381 27,846,846 
Terrassa 210,941 25,106,129 25,970,685 31,223,964 28,699,551 
Jerez de la Frontera 207,532 26,994,255 25,286,303 30,322,348 27,574,059 
Sabadell 206,493 26,075,083 25,366,259 30,480,367 27,952,389 
Móstoles 206,478 29,249,723 25,501,818 30,684,255 28,293,862 
Alcalá de Henares 204,574 28,228,430 25,305,940 30,460,230 28,131,162 
Fuenlabrada 197,836 27,750,718 24,425,418 29,386,428 27,087,046 
Almería 188,810 24,223,155 23,240,974 27,940,611 25,676,068 
Leganés 186,066 27,069,805 23,354,133 28,210,931 26,430,221 
Santander 182,700 25,117,668 22,514,983 27,075,588 24,910,427 
Castellón de la Plana 180,005 21,852,951 22,143,361 26,616,940 24,444,212 
Burgos 178,966 23,235,967 22,017,985 26,466,962 24,309,212 
Albacete 169,716 21,505,564 21,192,920 25,568,422 23,835,149 
Alcorcón 167,967 22,561,406 21,159,470 25,582,358 24,051,901 
Getafe 167,164 23,325,299 20,655,285 24,855,515 22,929,345 
Salamanca 155,619 21,617,348 19,448,413 23,468,389 21,894,911 
Logroño 152,107 19,147,951 18,933,545 22,824,820 21,210,894 
San Cristóbal de La Laguna 150,661 18,539,935 19,024,694 23,014,547 21,687,105 
Huelva 148,806 19,882,965 18,404,935 22,152,904 20,456,288 
Badajoz 148,334 18,987,097 18,531,281 22,359,723 20,853,212 
Tarragona 140,323 19,575,921 17,291,132 20,793,144 19,128,656 
Lleida 135,919 16,919,435 16,937,167 20,423,625 19,000,088 
Marbella 134,623 17,847,570 16,595,768 19,959,032 18,369,168 
León 134,305 19,166,844 16,750,126 20,202,227 18,809,677 
Cádiz 126,766 30,608,361 29,378,364 19,036,249 17,700,564 
Dos Hermanas 122,943 14,291,981 15,915,048 19,366,084 18,673,299 
Mataró 121,722 15,350,231 15,428,643 18,681,232 17,666,982 
Santa Coloma de Gramenet 119,717 27,082,244 28,233,728 18,711,195 17,938,772 
Torrejón de Ardoz 118,162 15,203,926 15,164,619 18,415,689 17,618,320 
Jaén 116,557 15,433,572 14,915,793 18,101,281 17,271,899 
Algeciras 116,209 14,617,079 14,461,853 17,433,127 16,196,814 
Parla 115,611 11,494,499 14,675,610 17,775,682 16,833,908 
Alcobendas 109,104 15,830,527 13,636,890 16,456,117 15,354,625 
Ourense 107,742 14,690,039 13,731,431 16,647,852 15,824,887 
Reus 107,118 12,470,853 13,333,452 16,073,757 14,937,106 
Torrevieja 101,792 9,847,130 13,254,363 16,150,349 15,654,076 
Telde 100,015 11,830,378 13,079,341 15,952,951 15,521,703 
Lugo 96,678 11,754,940 11,162,109 10,406,413 10,212,478 
San Fernando 96,366 11,007,935 11,046,486 10,253,427 9,980,518 
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Girona 96,188 10,928,537 10,910,365 10,060,913 9,672,790 
Santiago de Compostela 95,092 12,669,560 11,038,437 10,324,858 10,193,546 
Cáceres 93,131 10,966,802 10,778,746 10,063,855 9,903,196 
Lorca 91,906 10,106,096 10,746,748 10,096,151 10,047,387 
Coslada 90,280 11,289,620 10,854,133 10,363,804 10,613,418 
Talavera de la Reina 88,856 9,611,017 10,561,633 10,018,390 10,142,771 
Puerto de Santa María (El) 87,696 10,688,708 10,106,209 9,411,286 9,216,499 
Cornellà de Llobregat 86,519 11,273,484 10,259,593 9,718,508 9,815,359 
Rozas de Madrid (Las) 86,340 10,406,483 10,142,684 9,554,877 9,555,845 
Orihuela 86,164 9,807,130 10,070,406 9,457,996 9,407,359 
Avilés 84,242 10,228,848 9,743,082 9,092,989 8,940,791 
Ejido (El) 84,227 9,234,356 9,747,943 9,101,262 8,955,687 
Guadalajara 83,039 9,083,092 9,549,927 8,882,106 8,678,061 
Roquetas de Mar 82,665 8,116,493 9,707,517 9,143,005 9,140,481 
Palencia 82,651 10,219,904 9,797,939 9,279,556 9,369,099 
Sant Boi de Llobregat 82,428 11,184,437 9,764,570 9,244,119 9,326,486 
Pozuelo de Alarcón 82,428 10,639,532 9,437,982 8,754,237 8,510,017 
Toledo 82,291 9,868,846 9,604,403 9,012,848 8,951,140 
Pontevedra 81,576 9,931,302 9,490,140 8,888,318 8,796,335 
Gandia 80,020 9,156,717 9,220,468 8,585,798 8,406,913 
Sant Cugat del Vallès 79,253 11,054,300 9,335,745 8,808,986 8,835,471 
Ceuta 78,674 10,292,322 8,595,247 7,736,190 7,090,189 
Arona 78,614 8,528,531 9,197,165 8,643,000 8,605,965 
Torrent 78,543 8,812,083 9,432,545 9,000,723 9,207,408 
Chiclana de la Frontera 77,293 9,558,337 9,223,593 8,769,226 8,913,787 
Manresa 76,558 9,683,675 8,897,808 8,328,724 8,233,835 
San Sebastián de los Reyes 75,912 10,507,695 9,049,413 8,598,474 8,731,070 
Ferrol 74,273 9,544,043 8,996,861 8,627,074 8,899,640 
Vélez-Málaga 74,190 9,229,237 8,953,706 8,567,782 8,806,943 
Ciudad Real 74,014 9,164,802 8,563,499 7,994,007 7,863,633 
Mijas 73,787 7,935,947 9,015,447 8,686,808 9,035,046 
Melilla 73,460 9,248,579 8,157,529 7,421,364 6,950,094 
Rubí 72,987 9,687,528 8,525,280 8,003,993 7,956,034 
Fuengirola 71,482 8,405,947 8,793,270 8,504,623 8,901,436 
Benidorm 71,034 10,428,129 8,260,141 7,734,294 7,650,601 
Alcalá de Guadaíra 70,155 8,817,083 8,445,911 8,070,562 8,275,888 
Ponferrada 68,736 9,636,093 8,517,711 8,271,271 8,715,076 
Rivas-Vaciamadrid 68,405 6,661,712 8,095,275 7,659,313 7,719,563 
Majadahonda 68,110 9,139,153 8,350,710 8,061,801 8,412,137 
Zamora 66,293 8,222,685 8,023,575 7,690,193 7,926,823 
Sagunto/Sagunt 66,070 8,351,985 7,721,532 7,251,745 7,212,527 
Vilanova i la Geltrú 65,890 8,463,187 7,784,979 7,358,714 7,404,087 
Sanlúcar de Barrameda 65,805 9,057,759 7,652,790 7,166,002 7,089,170 
Estepona 65,592 7,347,375 7,696,904 7,246,134 7,238,436 
Torremolinos 65,448 7,525,489 7,615,414 7,133,338 7,061,063 
Línea de la Concepción (La) 64,595 15,477,080 7,694,810 7,308,341 7,415,658 
Molina de Segura 64,065 7,119,287 7,694,344 7,342,380 7,511,486 
Paterna 64,023 7,179,609 7,890,033 7,638,667 8,008,395 
Santa Lucía de Tirajana 63,637 7,419,853 7,991,564 7,816,265 8,332,865 
Viladecans 63,489 9,658,201 7,709,864 7,403,415 7,655,700 
Prat de Llobregat (El) 63,418 10,610,687 7,392,933 6,932,672 6,876,366 
Valdemoro 62,750 5,544,882 7,722,052 7,470,134 7,821,412 
Castelldefels 62,080 8,432,791 7,612,146 7,349,190 7,669,261 
Alcoy/Alcoi 61,552 8,993,989 7,543,279 7,280,498 7,593,723 
Linares 61,338 8,343,284 7,403,501 7,084,857 7,283,440 
Granollers 60,658 8,283,128 7,099,671 6,673,683 6,648,311 
Motril 60,279 7,862,507 7,565,979 7,397,987 7,883,441 
Arrecife 59,127 7,231,605 7,287,448 7,055,698 7,397,938 
Benalmádena 58,854 6,093,336 7,148,591 6,865,306 7,100,756 
Cerdanyola del Vallès 58,747 9,184,736 7,491,397 7,386,529 7,977,354 
Ávila 56,855 6,871,769 7,067,736 6,875,048 7,264,451 
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Segovia 56,660 6,924,063 6,929,569 6,680,579 6,954,720 
Mérida 56,395 6,641,396 6,701,777 6,356,260 6,433,736 
Torrelavega 55,947 8,394,867 6,891,597 6,670,354 6,990,275 
Cuenca 55,866 6,089,456 6,782,757 6,512,403 6,732,998 
Elda 55,168 8,040,932 6,805,039 6,591,577 6,916,443 
Collado Villalba 55,027 7,130,017 6,636,471 6,347,967 6,520,826 
Aranjuez 54,055 6,231,516 6,798,806 6,655,178 7,104,546 
San Vicente del Raspeig 53,126 6,294,057 6,608,750 6,430,986 6,799,420 
Mollet del Vallès 52,484 7,231,495 6,196,536 5,854,744 5,886,376 
San Bartolomé de Tirajana 52,161 7,882,008 6,546,372 6,400,670 6,820,078 
Huesca 52,059 6,099,013 6,267,259 5,988,685 6,140,962 
Puertollano 51,842 7,300,485 6,058,884 5,690,347 5,659,738 
Calvià 51,774 8,061,450 6,171,498 5,863,724 5,953,716 
Arganda del Rey 51,489 5,889,316 6,559,435 6,464,310 6,975,715 
Vila-real 51,205 6,691,907 6,639,660 6,603,263 7,228,253 
Siero 51,181 6,693,165 6,401,488 6,247,577 6,637,214 
Utrera 50,665 6,645,838 6,444,389 6,345,751 6,838,901 
Eivissa 48,684 6,108,485 5,831,128 5,673,428 5,864,493 
Esplugues de Llobregat 46,862 7,457,396 5,954,502 5,973,505 6,499,023 
Gavà 45,994 7,045,381 5,719,004 5,675,052 6,065,630 
Langreo 45,565 6,476,227 5,893,520 5,963,907 6,578,701 
Antequera 45,168 6,149,056 5,849,235 5,922,541 6,539,043 
Alzira 44,690 5,940,711 5,710,183 5,744,139 6,276,965 
Dénia 44,464 5,758,538 5,410,830 5,309,375 5,569,030 
Mieres 44,070 6,500,009 5,544,141 5,534,214 5,972,826 
Mislata 43,756 5,980,345 5,606,621 5,647,756 6,185,225 
Colmenar Viejo 43,700 5,986,810 5,828,299 5,983,807 6,749,441 
Pinto 43,501 5,238,879 5,378,170 5,321,177 5,659,737 
Boadilla del Monte 43,414 4,755,833 5,596,972 5,654,871 6,222,311 
Figueres 43,330 5,328,598 5,243,996 5,130,710 5,354,906 
Adeje 43,204 4,495,986 5,172,994 5,032,162 5,199,953 
Sant Feliu de Llobregat 42,919 6,804,643 5,587,147 5,671,381 6,286,342 
Lucena 42,248 5,667,452 5,408,727 5,446,110 5,960,387 
Orotava (La) 41,171 5,515,765 5,244,999 5,268,505 5,743,825 
Plasencia 41,148 5,353,177 5,431,944 5,550,374 6,215,303 
Alcantarilla 41,084 4,959,348 5,370,530 5,462,294 6,073,224 
Tres Cantos 41,064 6,648,405 5,260,843 5,299,026 5,802,586 
San Fernando de Henares 40,981 6,011,496 5,286,054 5,342,082 5,880,469 
Mairena del Aljarafe 40,700 5,230,638 5,172,808 5,189,952 5,647,647 
Manacor 40,548 5,074,480 5,082,833 5,064,585 5,449,914 
Écija 40,400 5,761,093 5,070,117 5,054,853 5,444,611 
Puerto Real 40,183 5,773,054 4,958,442 4,901,039 5,204,262 
Blanes 40,047 5,213,531 4,868,803 4,775,165 5,004,505 
Granadilla de Abona 39,993 4,035,336 4,924,208 4,861,682 5,152,682 
Vic 39,844 5,137,148 4,844,953 4,752,206 4,981,214 
Soria 39,528 4,578,299 5,140,624 5,215,660 5,776,948 
Lloret de Mar 39,363 4,113,497 4,829,418 4,759,267 5,028,464 
Miranda de Ebro 39,264 5,212,310 4,949,323 4,945,375 5,345,946 
Andújar 39,111 5,364,602 5,092,345 5,169,565 5,730,883 
Igualada 38,918 5,171,649 4,783,973 4,719,191 4,994,497 
Rincón de la Victoria 38,666 4,064,472 4,810,615 4,775,062 5,106,204 
Burjassot 38,433 5,084,913 5,126,547 5,263,669 5,937,736 
Vilafranca del Penedès 38,425 4,836,767 4,792,434 4,763,004 5,103,885 
Tomelloso 38,095 4,603,979 4,768,988 4,748,667 5,104,331 
Ontinyent 37,735 4,807,651 4,878,074 4,935,022 5,441,479 
Narón 37,712 4,822,304 5,023,675 5,154,875 5,809,597 
Vilagarcía de Arousa 37,576 4,835,691 5,120,184 5,308,223 6,075,210 
Realejos (Los) 37,559 4,890,623 5,136,987 5,334,502 6,120,262 
Ripollet 37,088 5,125,936 4,792,489 4,847,488 5,343,316 
Ronda 36,827 4,912,242 4,773,990 4,836,215 5,343,780 
Palacios y Villafranca (Los) 36,824 4,685,465 5,057,654 5,261,900 6,053,476 
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Arucas 36,259 4,649,447 5,529,214 6,004,907 7,333,500 
Llucmajor 36,078 3,969,067 4,683,492 4,747,750 5,251,589 
Rinconada (La) 35,928 4,403,414 4,822,429 4,965,624 5,625,778 
Vendrell (El) 35,821 4,399,719 4,483,119 4,463,414 4,796,653 
Don Benito 35,791 4,470,720 4,878,238 5,057,985 5,789,819 
Puerto del Rosario 35,667 3,685,488 4,685,784 4,777,133 5,330,879 
Úbeda 35,649 4,775,501 4,892,795 5,088,786 5,851,628 
Teruel 35,396 4,115,718 4,619,964 4,695,511 5,214,832 
Villena 35,222 4,734,224 4,663,555 4,771,881 5,354,951 
Mazarrón 35,221 3,537,800 4,547,587 4,597,991 5,065,209 
Cieza 35,200 4,591,872 4,758,221 4,915,269 5,595,555 
Tortosa 35,143 4,659,391 4,355,341 4,314,547 4,598,555 
Alhaurín de la Torre 35,114 3,625,427 4,305,865 4,242,164 4,480,056 
Yecla 35,025 4,567,909 4,716,561 4,863,826 5,522,724 
Borriana/Burriana 34,565 4,257,512 4,555,057 4,650,608 5,201,295 
Águilas 34,533 4,102,747 4,588,542 4,702,855 5,290,733 
Petrer 34,523 4,685,878 4,626,000 4,759,673 5,386,167 
Villajoyosa/Vila Joiosa (la) 33,797 3,909,578 4,779,413 5,035,624 5,899,639 
Sant Adrià de Besòs 33,761 5,403,255 4,296,726 4,313,865 4,699,363 
Almendralejo 33,588 3,995,629 4,639,986 4,839,677 5,588,478 
Olot 33,524 4,291,616 4,541,141 4,695,449 5,352,820 
Montcada i Reixac 33,453 4,913,948 4,380,498 4,458,967 4,963,920 
Oleiros 33,443 4,045,145 4,779,847 5,058,621 5,964,081 
Marratxí 33,348 3,495,834 4,326,100 4,383,998 4,846,716 
Aranda de Duero 32,928 4,397,086 4,425,187 4,559,141 5,169,604 
Vall d'Uixó (la) 32,924 4,406,003 4,344,094 4,437,754 4,967,588 
Azuqueca de Henares 32,744 3,114,552 4,371,217 4,489,802 5,067,611 
Puerto de la Cruz 32,219 5,408,400 4,479,409 4,685,231 5,432,054 
Sant Joan Despí 32,030 4,881,649 4,323,512 4,463,317 5,076,140 
Galapagar 31,820 4,194,127 4,623,058 4,925,893 5,862,590 
Santa Pola 31,760 3,977,809 4,316,494 4,469,834 5,106,917 
Cambrils 31,720 3,640,947 4,132,601 4,196,520 4,654,344 
Castro-Urdiales 31,670 3,594,385 4,460,291 4,691,212 5,482,519 
Jávea/Xàbia 31,593 4,683,580 4,378,520 4,573,416 5,291,873 
Torre-Pacheco 31,495 3,876,697 4,264,742 4,408,935 5,024,967 
San Javier 31,432 3,753,558 4,346,464 4,535,495 5,240,548 
Camargo 31,404 4,026,847 4,102,162 4,170,809 4,634,804 
Santa Eulalia del Río 31,314 3,724,801 4,138,427 4,230,888 4,741,574 
Arcos de la Frontera 31,210 4,251,538 3,980,118 3,999,990 4,364,415 
Valdepeñas 31,147 3,816,688 4,130,363 4,229,334 4,751,303 
Barberà del Vallès 31,144 4,053,262 4,177,554 4,300,311 4,869,818 
Carballo 30,990 3,969,227 5,112,262 5,712,093 7,234,149 
Hellín 30,976 4,044,246 4,318,017 4,521,609 5,251,042 
San Andrés del Rabanedo 30,906 3,833,656 4,502,293 4,802,442 5,724,261 
Xirivella 30,691 3,932,068 4,386,363 4,642,120 5,472,917 
Alcázar de San Juan 30,675 3,914,145 3,668,837 3,566,841 3,681,965 
Manises 30,508 3,907,729 4,240,112 4,434,296 5,140,042 
Alaquàs 30,392 4,080,350 4,158,083 4,318,575 4,955,731 
Puente Genil 30,033 3,982,512 4,119,942 4,284,026 4,924,632 
Redondela 30,001 4,017,792 4,661,776 5,098,797 6,284,944 
Salt 29,985 3,407,215 4,045,914 4,176,014 4,748,152 
Aldaia 29,914 3,735,506 4,090,689 4,247,659 4,872,798 
Arteixo 29,762 3,604,415 4,150,552 4,347,048 5,049,659 
Calp 29,666 3,385,980 3,770,811 3,783,497 4,117,487 
Xàtiva 29,386 3,866,315 3,799,316 3,843,931 4,238,866 
Ingenio 29,319 3,627,810 4,249,862 4,523,978 5,377,221 
Inca 29,308 3,425,195 3,721,392 3,731,967 4,058,014 
San Roque 29,249 4,122,309 3,611,086 3,570,234 3,792,811 
Totana 29,211 3,598,805 4,064,633 4,252,954 4,933,479 
Ciutadella de Menorca 29,160 3,806,457 3,940,131 4,069,420 4,631,352 
Maó 29,125 3,913,253 3,960,185 4,101,710 4,687,750 
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Agüimes 28,924 3,252,229 3,852,995 3,953,613 4,455,750 
Sueca 28,908 3,995,015 4,110,134 4,340,332 5,101,462 
Crevillent 28,609 3,899,188 3,932,538 4,092,813 4,710,986 
Rota 28,516 4,285,952 3,886,202 4,029,180 4,611,791 
Morón de la Frontera 28,455 3,898,021 3,670,889 3,710,061 4,084,425 
Oliva 28,419 3,403,026 3,793,205 3,895,807 4,396,658 
Sant Pere de Ribes 28,353 3,475,304 3,899,463 4,059,360 4,674,115 
Carmona 28,344 3,899,013 3,881,043 4,032,299 4,629,676 
Algemesí 28,308 3,755,519 3,977,750 4,179,632 4,877,888 
Vinaròs 28,273 3,606,820 3,976,231 4,179,563 4,880,354 
Culleredo 28,227 3,370,787 4,340,437 4,728,776 5,799,103 
Coria del Río 28,100 3,402,823 4,003,695 4,231,679 4,979,976 
Sant Vicenç dels Horts 27,701 4,119,964 3,798,121 3,948,506 4,537,454 
Almuñécar 27,696 - - - - 
Sitges 27,668 3,782,853 3,619,631 3,682,854 4,097,134 
Ribeira 27,518 3,594,485 4,193,885 4,553,704 5,559,616 
Premià de Mar 27,399 3,917,535 3,688,410 3,803,004 4,317,228 
Novelda 27,135 3,576,649 3,639,835 3,746,807 4,243,040 
Catarroja 27,035 3,100,656 3,773,593 3,953,756 4,595,332 
Ames 26,983 2,742,602 4,053,306 4,376,610 5,303,923 
Martorell 26,681 3,768,041 3,414,408 3,437,327 3,760,729 
Benicarló 26,655 3,032,628 3,634,341 3,768,867 4,315,214 
Salou 26,649 3,282,159 3,586,733 3,697,833 4,197,267 
Villarrobledo 26,642 3,524,846 3,527,229 3,609,019 4,049,760 
Níjar 26,516 2,886,253 3,865,750 4,124,755 4,918,615 
Campello (el) 26,511 3,319,930 3,825,237 4,064,301 4,818,226 
Villaviciosa de Odón 26,475 3,460,092 4,522,792 5,112,907 6,568,558 
Lebrija 26,434 3,583,149 3,552,458 3,659,994 4,150,061 
Caravaca de la Cruz 26,415 3,322,422 3,631,883 3,780,331 4,352,024 
Sant Andreu de la Barca 26,401 3,483,907 3,619,640 3,762,850 4,323,922 
Pineda de Mar 26,203 3,382,594 3,666,229 3,845,233 4,475,832 
Camas 26,015 3,511,986 3,954,662 4,289,750 5,230,563 
Marín 25,969 3,293,589 4,166,168 4,609,913 5,767,560 
Lepe 25,886 3,173,648 3,712,701 3,934,952 4,648,748 
Villanueva de la Serena 25,838 3,428,815 3,279,081 3,287,551 3,573,288 
Cangas 25,748 3,285,021 5,013,131 5,894,307 7,924,520 
Almansa 25,727 3,410,632 3,459,345 3,564,954 4,043,814 
Onda 25,691 3,030,286 3,448,968 3,551,662 4,024,316 
Jumilla 25,685 3,247,864 3,488,395 3,611,182 4,123,958 
Quart de Poblet 25,499 3,781,438 3,559,577 3,729,696 4,335,203 
Valls 25,092 3,156,431 3,392,087 3,504,153 3,989,319 
Santa Perpètua de Mogoda 25,048 2,933,082 3,494,354 3,660,332 4,252,864 
Almazora/Almassora 24,963 2,450,034 3,443,946 3,590,084 4,142,055 
Calahorra 24,787 3,046,505 3,587,085 3,815,904 4,531,405 
Martos 24,655 3,205,236 3,542,438 3,757,266 4,443,412 
Gáldar 24,405 3,220,625 4,077,582 4,575,763 5,826,015 
Adra 24,373 3,062,978 3,736,290 4,065,846 4,978,514 
Candelaria 24,319 2,308,669 3,791,147 4,151,541 5,125,321 
Calafell 24,265 2,880,239 3,129,301 3,162,179 3,480,369 
Cullera 24,121 3,600,575 3,287,817 3,409,045 3,902,433 
Ibi 24,113 3,421,945 3,628,003 3,919,829 4,754,330 
Molins de Rei 24,067 3,528,782 3,389,214 3,564,548 4,165,589 
Icod de los Vinos 24,024 3,155,857 4,115,630 4,656,887 5,989,325 
Montilla 23,840 3,252,334 3,442,594 3,658,948 4,339,667 
Altea 23,780 2,687,129 3,271,473 3,406,055 3,922,605 
San Pedro del Pinatar 23,738 2,448,207 3,268,310 3,403,962 3,922,214 
Tacoronte 23,562 - - - - 
Paiporta 23,519 2,796,168 3,813,068 4,234,924 5,323,305 
Priego de Córdoba 23,513 3,172,422 3,673,740 4,026,311 4,976,059 
Baza 23,359 2,863,418 3,571,563 3,882,766 4,748,179 
Alhaurín el Grande 23,319 2,422,191 3,434,853 3,680,226 4,413,562 
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Olesa de Montserrat 23,301 2,675,197 3,411,351 3,646,110 4,358,030 
Cambre 23,231 2,870,257 3,662,792 4,027,689 4,999,158 
Ponteareas 23,172 2,764,770 3,827,146 4,277,946 5,420,605 
Castellar del Vallès 23,002 2,625,043 3,233,362 3,398,000 3,966,569 
Barbate 22,912 3,083,690 3,471,033 3,760,189 4,576,857 
Castrillón 22,894 3,183,660 3,433,676 3,705,289 4,486,684 
Vícar 22,853 2,248,195 3,356,924 3,592,749 4,302,143 
Alcalá la Real 22,783 3,050,007 2,808,966 2,775,231 2,944,776 
Tomares 22,772 2,384,903 3,364,681 3,609,498 4,336,032 
Llíria 22,706 2,479,438 3,320,013 3,546,663 4,236,176 
Mutxamel 22,510 2,284,522 3,410,162 3,694,260 4,496,628 
Mejorada del Campo 22,488 2,707,377 3,657,632 4,066,852 5,119,239 
Alboraya 22,405 2,541,647 3,568,525 3,938,431 4,911,326 
Palafrugell 22,365 3,055,594 2,898,508 2,935,931 3,243,444 
Barrios (Los) 22,311 2,568,603 3,197,301 3,387,530 4,000,092 
Masnou (El) 22,288 3,071,419 3,172,522 3,351,813 3,942,261 
Sant Josep de sa Talaia 22,171 2,416,447 3,400,791 3,701,603 4,533,873 
Ciempozuelos 22,132 2,040,918 3,493,529 3,843,172 4,772,699 
Pilar de la Horadada 22,050 2,057,292 3,432,799 3,757,252 4,635,549 
Oliva (La) 21,996 2,128,377 3,333,464 3,611,660 4,396,878 
Sant Feliu de Guíxols 21,977 3,005,939 3,069,185 3,216,441 3,739,580 
Sant Joan d'Alacant 21,939 2,457,022 3,345,400 3,633,161 4,436,917 
Calatayud 21,933 2,477,587 3,272,887 3,524,770 4,256,709 
Moncada 21,900 2,572,694 3,363,336 3,662,527 4,488,737 
Estrada (A) 21,880 3,027,057 4,077,257 4,734,671 6,277,119 
Coín 21,866 2,465,423 3,182,699 3,393,718 4,043,230 
Esparreguera 21,855 2,558,383 2,935,747 3,023,985 3,427,821 
Sant Antoni de Portmany 21,852 2,367,447 2,916,436 2,995,207 3,380,078 
Nerja 21,811 2,451,743 3,172,797 3,382,337 4,028,319 
Almonte 21,782 2,729,184 2,764,765 2,772,120 3,013,431 
Torrelodones 21,781 2,360,862 3,296,338 3,569,542 4,342,542 
Laguna de Duero 21,762 2,872,675 3,542,247 3,939,606 4,960,716 
Carcaixent 21,735 2,900,549 3,210,004 3,442,945 4,134,939 
Mogán 21,690 2,580,761 3,011,094 3,147,421 3,645,719 
Palma del Río 21,588 2,587,428 2,952,299 3,065,668 3,516,987 
Navalcarnero 21,584 2,038,963 3,129,611 3,331,887 3,960,982 
Loja 21,574 2,946,560 3,272,535 3,546,906 4,320,084 
Medina del Campo 21,540 2,819,211 3,158,574 3,378,109 4,041,264 
Armilla 21,380 2,107,320 3,368,927 3,703,740 4,595,784 
Cabra 21,352 2,867,162 3,239,760 3,511,757 4,277,877 
Isla Cristina 21,324 2,690,200 3,717,465 4,230,082 5,477,152 
Cártama 21,313 1,887,758 3,466,765 3,854,726 4,852,370 
Requena 21,278 2,487,972 3,358,271 3,694,194 4,587,399 
Illescas 21,264 1,604,261 2,939,618 3,067,098 3,543,272 
Lalín 21,254 2,758,351 3,816,493 4,383,043 5,737,250 
Amposta 21,240 2,356,367 2,913,519 3,029,466 3,482,321 
Torres de Cotillas (Las) 21,062 2,166,185 2,857,769 2,957,076 3,374,803 
Alfàs del Pi (l') 21,011 2,226,121 3,139,019 3,382,171 4,087,056 
Conil de la Frontera 20,984 2,418,331 3,143,752 3,390,975 4,103,721 
Baena 20,915 2,558,769 3,410,007 3,794,713 4,781,708 
Vila-seca 20,866 2,161,603 2,935,747 3,086,417 3,604,829 
Alfafar 20,853 2,582,674 3,188,227 3,465,958 4,238,355 
Pájara 20,821 2,537,468 3,247,549 3,556,960 4,392,387 
Maracena 20,815 2,135,195 2,916,730 3,061,111 3,566,414 
San Juan de Aznalfarache 20,779 2,878,710 3,248,941 3,561,700 4,403,385 
Llanos de Aridane (Los) 20,766 2,758,405 3,465,635 3,887,562 4,947,447 
Bétera 20,740 2,126,230 3,099,266 3,339,649 4,036,177 
Manlleu 20,647 2,490,129 3,070,008 3,301,634 3,979,677 
Guía de Isora 20,536 2,194,169 3,022,453 3,237,308 3,880,656 
Mairena del Alcor 20,510 2,245,235 2,932,109 3,103,433 3,659,448 
Rojales 20,510 1,466,903 3,517,345 3,981,288 5,122,540 
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Riba-roja de Túria 20,468 2,098,287 2,908,856 3,071,205 3,608,834 
Pobla de Vallbona (la) 20,431 1,905,136 2,855,126 2,992,946 3,481,131 
Guadix 20,395 2,716,919 3,519,474 3,991,740 5,148,444 
Ayamonte 20,334 2,402,963 3,110,362 3,381,923 4,136,582 
Algete 20,204 2,294,880 3,070,602 3,330,489 4,060,448 
Roses 20,197 2,527,128 2,799,338 2,924,036 3,383,542 
Aspe 20,180 2,374,743 2,867,708 3,027,663 3,557,508 
Piélagos 20,081 1,862,655 3,060,786 3,323,530 4,057,923 
TOTAL 25,300,479 3,503,105,285 3,503,105,285 3,503,105,285 3,503,105,285 
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